The Word 'Parrhesia'

The following is an exerpt from tape recordings made of six lectures delivered, in English, by Michel Foucault at the University of California at Berkeley. The lectures were given as part of Foucault's seminar, entitled "Discourse and Truth," devoted to the study of the Greek notion of 'parrhesia' or "frankness in speaking the truth."
(Note: if you want more information about this or about Foucault visit: www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michel_Foucault )

The meaning of the word: 'Parrhesia' is ordinarily translated into English by "free speech" (in French by 'franc-parler', and in German by 'Freimuthigkeit'). 'Parrhesiastes' is the one who uses 'parrhesia', i.e., the one who speaks the truth.

Frankness: The one who uses 'parrhesia', the 'parrhesiastes', is someone who says everything she has in mind: she does not hide anything, but opens her heart and mind completely to other people through her discourse. In 'parrhesia' the speaker is supposed to give a complete and exact account of what she has in mind so that the audience is able to comprehend exactly what the speaker thinks. The word 'parrhesia', then, refers to a type of relationship between the speaker and what she says. For in 'parrhesia', the speaker makes it manifestly clear and obvious that what she says is her own opinion. And she does this by avoiding any kind of rhetorical form, which would veil what she thinks. Instead, the 'parrhesiastes' uses the most direct words and forms of expression she can find. Whereas rhetoric provides the speaker with technical devices to help her prevail upon the minds of her audience (regardless of the rhetorician's own opinion concerning what she says), in 'parrhesia', the 'parrhesiastes' acts on other people's minds by showing them as directly as possible what she actually believes.

Truth: There are two types of 'parrhesia', which we must distinguish. First, there is a pejorative sense of the word not very far from "chattering," and which consists in saying any- or everything one has in mind without qualification. This pejorative meaning is found more frequently in Christian literature where such "bad" 'parrhesia' is opposed to silence as a discipline or as the requisite condition for the contemplation of God. Most of the time, however, 'parrhesia' does not have this pejorative meaning in the classical texts, but rather a positive one. "Parrhesiazesthai', means "to tell the truth." But does the 'parrhesiastes' say what he thinks is true, or does he say what is really true? To my mind, the 'parrhesiates' says what is true because he knows that it is true; and he knows that it is true because it really is true. The 'parrhesiastes' is not only sincere and says what is his opinion, but his opinion is also the truth. The second characteristic of 'parrhesia', then, is that there is always an exact coincidence between belief and truth.

Evolution Of The Word: Rhetoric, Politics, Philosophy

Rhetoric: The relationship of 'parrhesia' to rhetoric-a relationship, which is problematic even in Euripides. In the Socratic-Platonic tradition. 'Parrhesia' and rhetoric stand in strong opposition; and this opposition appears very clearly in the 'Gorgias' for example, where the word 'parrhesia' occurs. The continuous long speech is a rhetorical or sophistical device, whereas the dialogue is a major technique for the playing the parrhesiastic game. The opposition of 'parrhesia' and rhetoric also runs through the 'Phaedrus'-where, as you know, the main problem is not about the nature of the opposition between speech and writing, but concerns the difference between the 'logos' which speaks the truth and the 'logos' which is not capable of such truth-telling. This opposition between 'parrhesia' and rhetoric, which is so clear-cut in the Fourth Century B.C. throughout Plato's writings, will last for centuries in the philosophical tradition. In Seneca, for example, one finds the idea that personal conversations are the best vehicle for frank speaking and truth-telling insofar as one can dispense, in such conversations. And even during the Second Century A.D. the cultural opposition between rhetoric and philosophy is still very clear and important. However, one can also find some signs of the incorporation of 'parrhesia' within the field of rhetoric in the work of rhetoricians at the beginning of the Empire. In Quintillian's 'Institutio Oratoria' for example (Book IX, Chapter II), Quintillian explains that some rhetorical figures are specifically adapted for intensifying the emotions of the audience; and such technical figures he calls by the name 'exclamatio' (exclamation). Related to these exclamations is a kind of natural exclamation, which, Quintillian notes, is not "simulated or artfully designed." This type of natural exclamation he calls "free speech" ['libera oratione'] which, he tells us, was called "license" ['licentia'] by Cornificius, and 'parrhesia' by the Greeks. 'Parrhesia' is thus a sort of "figure" among rhetorical figures, but with this characteristic" that it is without any figure since it is completely natural. 'Parrhesia' is the zero degree of those rhetorical figures, which intensify the emotions of the audience.